中文摘要
本文研究取消显性与隐性化石燃料补贴的福利效应,后者通过对本地空气污染实施矫正性定价来实现。我们将一个纳入全球供应链的多区域一般均衡模型与补贴、边际外部成本以及国民收入与产出账户的细颗粒度数据相匹配。平均而言,单边取消补贴使一国福利提高 3.2%,产生相当于消费 3.1% 的财政收入,并将实现《巴黎协定》目标所需的碳价降低 46%。在大多数国家,非市场收益超过市场损失。本地空气污染定价贡献了 97% 的净收益;仅取消显性补贴对福利和排放的影响较小。四分之一的国家将已实现其《巴黎协定》气候目标,从而使额外的碳定价变得多余。在所有国家,将取消补贴与碳定价相结合均优于单独实施碳定价。全球多边取消补贴使排放减少 27.4%,并使全球福利(不包括气候收益)提高 2.3%。矫正性化石燃料税收能够协调经济、财政与气候目标。(JEL 分类号:C68, H23, Q43, Q58)
Abstract
We study the welfare effects of removing explicit and implicit fossil fuel subsidies, the latter via corrective pricing of local air pollution. We map a multi-region general-equilibrium model with global supply chains to granular data on subsidies, marginal external costs, and national income and product accounts. On average, unilateral subsidy removal raises a country’s welfare by 3.2%, generates revenues equal to 3.1% of consumption, and lowers the carbon price needed for Paris targets by 46%. Non-market gains exceed market losses in most countries. Local air pollution pricing drives 97% of net benefits; removing explicit subsidies alone has minor effects on welfare and emissions. A quarter of countries would already reach their Paris climate target, making additional carbon pricing redundant. Combining subsidy removal with carbon pricing dominates carbon pricing alone everywhere. Global multilateral subsidy removal cuts emissions by 27.4% and raises global welfare, excluding climate benefits, by 2.3%. Corrective fossil fuel taxation can align economic, fiscal, and climate goals. (JEL C68, H23, Q43, Q58)