American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Brian G. Knight、NATHAN M. SCHIFF
中文摘要
美国大学招生是分散进行的，由此产生的摩擦限制了学生的选择。我们研究通用申请平台（Common Application，CA），在该平台下学生向成员学校提交一份统一申请，这有可能减少摩擦并增加学生的选择。通用申请平台增加了学校收到的申请数量，反映出摩擦的减少，并降低了被录取学生的报到率，反映出选择的增加。通用申请平台增加了外州入学人数，尤其是来自其他通用申请平台所在州的入学人数，这与网络效应相一致。加入通用申请平台改变了学生的构成，有证据表明种族多样性增加、高收入学生增多，关于SAT分数上升的证据则不精确。（JEL I23, I28）
Abstract
College admissions in the United States are decentralized, creating frictions that limit student choice. We study the Common Application (CA) platform, under which students submit a single application to member schools, potentially reducing frictions and increasing student choice. The CA increases the number of applications received by schools, reflecting a reduction in frictions, and reduces the yield on accepted students, reflecting increased choice. The CA increases out-of-state enrollment, especially from other CA states, consistent with network effects. Entry into the CA changes the composition of students, with evidence of more racial diversity and more high-income students and imprecise evidence of increases in SAT scores. (JEL I23, I28)