中文摘要
既有研究记录到，医保计划菜单中有时会存在被占优选项，但这种情况是否普遍？我们分析了凯撒家庭基金会关于企业向其雇员提供的医保计划的数据。在同时提供高免赔额和较低免赔额医保计划的企业中，有62%的情况下高免赔额选项对雇员而言具有更低的最大支出风险。我们估计，在高免赔额计划占优的企业约占一半。我们讨论了这些出人意料模式背后的潜在机制，并发现有两类解释均得到支持：普遍存在的逆向选择定价，以及部分雇主亦差别性地偏向高免赔额计划。(JEL G22, G52, I13)
Abstract
Prior research documents that there are sometimes dominated options in health plan menus, but is that common? We analyze Kaiser Family Foundation data on health plans that firms offer to their employees. For firms offering both a high-deductible and lower-deductible health plan, 62 percent of the time the high-deductible option has lower maximum spending risk for the employee. We estimate that the high-deductible plan dominates at roughly half of firms. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these surprising patterns and find support both for two explanations: widespread adverse-selection pricing and some employers also differentially favoring high-deductible plans. (JEL G22, G52, I13)