中文摘要
本文研究一个包含工资议价、随机在职搜寻与再谈判的模型。工资由一个议价过程决定,在该过程中企业与工人轮流提出报价,且该过程存在破裂的概率。在模型中,给定的工资合同以泊松速率终止,随后企业与工人就新工资进行议价。在此设定下,更高的工资会降低企业的加成,但这一效应会被离职率的下降部分抵消,而离职率下降会增加匹配剩余。匹配剩余的增加使工人能够获取更高份额的剩余。当再谈判更频繁时,更高工资对匹配剩余的正面效应会减弱。最终,当合同长度趋于零时,模型的均衡收敛于Pissarides (1994)所讨论的均衡支付。我的模型由此为在职搜寻模型中使用具有完全可转移价值的纳什议价解提供了依据。相反,当泊松速率趋于零时,模型的均衡(我证明其为唯一)收敛于Shimer (2006)所发现的其中一个均衡。
Abstract
This paper studies a model with wage bargaining, random on-the-job search and renegotiation. Wages are determined by a bargaining process in which the firm and the worker alternate in making offers and there is a probability that this process breaks down. In the model, a given wage contract ends at a Poisson rate, and then the firm and the worker bargain over a new wage. In this setting, a higher wage decreases the firm's markup, but this effect is partly offset by lowering turnover, which increases match surplus. This increase in match surplus enables the worker to capture a higher share of the surplus. This positive effect of a higher wage on match surplus diminishes when they renegotiate more frequently. Eventually, as the contract length tends to zero, the equilibrium of the model converges to the equilibrium payoffs discussed by Pissarides (1994). My model thereby justifies using the Nash bargaining solution with perfectly transferable values in models with on-the-job search. In contrast, when the Poisson rate goes to zero, the equilibrium in the model, which I show to be unique, converges to one of the equilibria found by Shimer (2006).