中文摘要
本文在一个易于处理的异质性主体新凯恩斯主义(THANK)模型中研究最优通胀目标,该模型包含偶尔具有约束力的零利率下限,并纳入收入不平等、收入风险与逆周期财政政策。我们以解析方式刻画了周期性与长期不平等、收入风险以及财政政策如何在家庭之间塑造趋势通胀的福利权衡。更大的周期性不平等与收入风险会提高通胀的边际收益,尤其是对"月光"(hand-to-mouth, HtM)家庭而言,而长期不平等则会降低边际收益。定量来看,相对于代表性主体基准,收入不平等与收入风险会适度提高功利主义最优通胀率。我们进一步表明,逆周期财政政策会降低所有家庭的通胀边际收益,并降低最优通胀目标。最后,在收入不平等之外再加入以私人债务或政府债务形式存在的财富不平等,会提高最优通胀目标。
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal inflation target in a tractable heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (THANK) model with an occasionally binding zero lower bound, incorporating income inequality, income risk, and countercyclical fiscal policy. We analytically characterize how cyclical and long-run inequality, income risk, and fiscal policy shape the welfare trade-off of trend inflation across households. Greater cyclical inequality and income risk increase the marginal benefits of inflation, especially for hand-to-mouth (HtM) households, while long-run inequality reduces marginal benefits. Quantitatively, income inequality and income risk modestly raise the utilitarian optimal inflation rate relative to the representative agent benchmark. We further show that countercyclical fiscal policies lower the marginal benefit of inflation for all households and reduce the optimal inflation target. Finally, adding wealth inequality in the form of private or government debt, in addition to income inequality, raises the optimal inflation target.