公共部门正在失去人才争夺战吗？来自法国长期面板数据的证据
Is the Public Sector Losing the Battle for Talent? Evidence from Long French Panel Data
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Olivier Bargain", "affiliation": ["Université de Bordeaux", "Institut Universitaire de France", "Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Bordeaux", "Bordeaux Population Health"]}, {"name": "Audrey Etienne", "affiliation": ["Université de Rouen Normandie"]}, {"name": "Blaise Melly", "affiliation": ["University of Bern"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们利用法国一份异常长的行政面板数据集（1988–2019年），在控制个体固定效应的同时，估计公共部门就业的无条件分位数效应。我们发现，在控制了可观测和不可观测的异质性后，公共部门工资差距在整个工资分布上总体为负。公共部门压缩了工资分布，尤其在顶端观察到较大的工资惩罚。这一压缩效应部分被偶发参数偏差所掩盖，我们使用分割面板刀切法对其进行了修正。我们记录了政治周期与商业周期的组合如何与这三十二年间工资差距的演变相一致。尽管公共部门提供的薪酬较低，但它吸引的个体平均而言具有更好的可观测和不可观测技能。然而，这一技能差距随时间显著缩小，并在高收入者中消失，这要求采取政策以恢复公共部门管理职业的吸引力。
Abstract
Abstract We exploit an exceptionally long administrative panel dataset (1988–2019) for France to estimate the unconditional quantile effects of public sector employment, while accounting for individual fixed effects. We find that the public sector wage gap is broadly negative across the whole wage distribution after controlling for observable and unobservable heterogeneities. The public sector compresses the wage distribution, with particularly large wage penalties observed at the top. This compression effect is partly concealed by the incidental parameter bias, which we correct using a split-panel jackknife method. We document how a combination of political and business cycles aligns with the evolution of the wage gap over the thirty-two-year period. Despite offering lower pay, the public sector attracts individuals with, on average, better observed and unobserved skills. However, this skill gap narrows significantly over time and vanishes among top earners, calling for policies to restore the attractiveness of public sector management careers.