The Journal of Economic History · 2026 · Andreas Kotsadam、Magnus Bergli Rasmussen、Kalle Moene、Anders Kjelsrud、Haakon Gjerløw
中文摘要
罢工威胁在多大程度上会促使企业采用资本密集型方法以威慑罢工，或采用劳动密集型策略以在停工期间保持灵活性？我们提出了一个理论模型，说明产业行动威胁如何通过相对要素价格以及工人与雇主之间的力量博弈影响资本投资。利用新近数字化的挪威两次世界大战之间3,141起产业冲突与集体协议数据，我们的研究结果表明，罢工总体上促使企业转向资本密集度较低的技术。这一趋势在行业层面或国家层面得到解决的冲突中尤为明显，因为在这些情形下，罢工威胁对企业而言可能更具外生性。
Abstract
To what extent do strike threats prompt firms to adopt capital-intensive methods to deter strikes or labor-intensive strategies to maintain flexibility during work stoppages? We introduce a theoretical model that demonstrates how threats of industrial action influence capital investments through relative factor prices and the power dynamics between workers and employers. Using newly digitized data from 3,141 industrial conflicts and collective agreements in Norway during the interwar period, our findings indicate that strikes generally drive firms toward less capital-intensive technologies. This trend is particularly pronounced in conflicts resolved at the branch or national level, where strike threats may appear more exogenous to firms. *