Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890
中文摘要
我们提供的经验证据表明,当中央银行将其贴现便利的准入资格扩展至任何安全资产或有偿付能力的主体时,便能够更有效地缓解经济危机。十九世纪的法国作为一个案例研究,用以规避内生性。1863年之后,一场农业疫情增加了农业以外部门的违约。我们利用贴现窗口的若干特殊性,构造出中央银行准入的外生变异。回归结果显示,尽管这场疫情带来的需求冲击使农业以外的违约增加了20%,但只要当地设有中央银行的分支机构,这一效应便会显著降低。
Abstract
We provide empirical evidence that central banks can mitigate economic crises more efficiently when they extend eligibility for their discount facility to any safe asset or solvent agent. Nineteenth-century France serves as a case study to circumvent endogeneity. Following 1863, an agricultural pandemic increased defaults outside agriculture. We exploit specificities of the discount window to create exogenous variation in central bank access. Regressions show that while the demand shock brought about by the pandemic led to an increase in defaults outside agriculture by 20 percent, this effect was significantly reduced whenever a branch office of the central bank was present.