American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2025 · Antonio Dalla-Zuanna、Kai Liu、Kjell G. Salvanes
中文摘要
我们分析了高中入学制度从按居住地分配改革为择优分配所产生的效应。择优制度产生了报名人数超额的学校,这些学校以挤掉低GPA学生为代价偏向高GPA学生。我们运用潜在结果框架分析该改革的效应,将获得竞争性学校入学机会者的效应与失去入学机会者的效应分开,并利用录取分数线和GPA界定的子总体,以改革作为工具变量识别这些参数。改革的总体效应微小且为负,掩盖了被挤出学生所承受的大幅负向效应。
Abstract
We analyze the effects of reforming the high school admission system from a residence based allocation to a merit-based allocation. The merit-based system generates oversubscribed schools, which favor high-GPA students at the expense of displacing low-GPA ones. We use the potential outcomes framework to analyze the effects of the reform, separating the effects for those gaining access to competitive schools from those losing access and identifying these parameters by using the reform as an instrument within subpopulations defined by admission cutoffs and GPA. The small and negative overall effect of the reform hides large negative effects for the crowded-out students.