企业对税务审计的反应：来自基于阈值的审计项目的断点回归证据
Firm Responses to Tax Audits: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from a Threshold-Based Audit Program
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Haonan Li", "affiliation": ["Southwestern University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Xuan Wang", "affiliation": ["King University", "Peking University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文利用中国一项基于阈值的增值税案头审计项目，研究审计对税收遵从的因果影响。所有增值税与销售额比率低于该阈值的企业都会被税务机关联系，并必须通过自我审计证明其纳税申报的合理性。我们使用全国税收调查数据库，采用断点回归设计估计审计效应。我们发现，案头审计追回了大量税收收入，且尽管实际生产没有变化，被审计企业在随后两年申报了更多销项税额和进项税抵扣。增加的进项税抵扣中有一部分归因于购买虚假发票。有趣的是，较大纳税人在审计后缴纳的增值税反而更少。审计促使大企业采取更激进的税收筹划，它们更多地利用企业内部交易来规避增值税，且在拥有庞大子公司网络的企业中，这一影响更为显著。
Abstract
Abstract This paper investigates the causal impact of audits on tax compliance by exploiting a threshold-based VAT desk audit program in China. All firms below the VAT-to-sales ratio threshold are contacted by the tax authority and must justify their tax returns through self-audits. We estimate the audit effect using the National Tax Survey Database and a regression discontinuity design. We find that desk audits recovered a significant amount of tax revenues, and audited firms reported more output taxes and input tax credits in the subsequent two years despite no changes in real production. A portion of the increased input tax credit is attributed to the acquisition of fake invoices. Interestingly, larger taxpayers remit less VAT after the audit. The audit triggers more aggressive tax planning by large firms. They use more intrafirm transactions to avoid VAT, with a more significant impact among those with an expansive subsidiary network.