买方垄断与迁移的工资效应
Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Michael Amior", "affiliation": ["Hebrew University of Jerusalem"]}, {"name": "Alan Manning", "affiliation": ["Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}]
中文摘要
如果劳动力市场是竞争性的，移民只能通过边际产品影响本地人的工资。但在不完全竞争下，如果企业对移民比对本地人拥有更强的买方垄断势力，却又无法完全实施工资歧视，移民也可能提高工资压低幅度。边际产品取决于不同技能单元之间的相对劳动供给，而工资压低幅度则取决于各技能单元内部的移民集中度。这一洞见有助于解释经典移民模型所面临的经验违背现象。利用美国数据，我们发现移民确实提高了工资压低幅度：这扩大了本地人的总收入，但也将其从工人重新分配给了企业。限制企业对移民的买方垄断势力的政策，可以缓解这些不利的工资效应。
Abstract
Abstract If labour markets are competitive, migration can only affect native wages via marginal products. But under imperfect competition, migration may also increase wage mark-downs—if firms have greater monopsony power over migrants than natives, but cannot perfectly wage discriminate. While marginal products depend on relative labour supplies across skill cells, mark-downs depend on migrant concentration within them. This insight can help rationalise empirical violations of canonical migration models. Using US data, we conclude that migration does increase mark-downs: this expands aggregate native income, but redistributes it from workers to firms. Policies which constrain monopsony power over migrants can mitigate these adverse wage effects.