American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Bernhard Kasberger、Alexander Teytelboym
中文摘要
组合式多轮升价拍卖（CMRA）是近期欧洲频谱拍卖中采用的一种新型拍卖形式。我们证明，一种针对该拍卖设计的真实报价策略能够实现有效率的配置。随后，我们刻画了若干不同的事后均衡，这些均衡分别体现真实报价、需求扩张与需求收缩。真实报价均衡对投标人配额上限的微小不对称较为脆弱。此外，若投标人足够对称，CMRA 易受无风险合谋的影响。我们提出一种替代性的活动规则，既能阻止此类合谋策略，又能保持其他均衡不受影响。结合我们的均衡预测，我们讨论了若干丹麦 CMRA 的拍卖结果。（JEL D44, H82, L82）
Abstract
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize different ex post equilibria that feature truthful bidding, demand expansion, and demand reduction. The truth-telling equilibrium is fragile to small asymmetries in the bidders' caps. Moreover, if bidders are sufficiently symmetric, the CMRA is vulnerable to risk-free collusion. We propose an alternative activity rule that prevents such collusive strategies while keeping other equilibria intact. We discuss outcomes of several Danish CMRAs in light of our equilibrium predictions. (JEL D44, H82, L82)