中文摘要
本文研究存在竞标者预选的拍卖中的串通投标行为。我们构建一个理论模型来分析部分串通卡特尔的最优行为,并展示常用的两阶段拍卖形式——其中第一阶段用于预选竞标者——可能如何被利用。基于理论结果,我们构建了反映卡特尔最优策略的合谋标记,并利用斯洛伐克公共采购拍卖的行政数据,识别出涉嫌合谋的竞标者。我们表明,竞标者预选使卡特尔得以排除具有竞争力的对手,从而将采购成本提高到没有预选时所能达到的水平之上。(JEL D43, D44, H57, L12)
Abstract
This paper studies bid rigging in auctions with bidder preselection. We develop a theoretical model to analyze the optimal behavior of partial bid-rigging cartels and show how commonly used two-stage auction formats, in which the first stage is used to preselect bidders, may be exploited. Based on our theoretical results, we construct a collusion marker reflecting the optimal cartel strategy and, using administrative data on public procurement auctions in Slovakia, we identify bidders suspected of collusion. We show that bidder preselection allows cartels to exclude competitive rivals and thereby increase procurement costs above what would be possible without preselection. (JEL D43, D44, H57, L12)