American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Giacomo Calzolari、Vincenzo Denicolò
中文摘要
我们分析了寡头竞争情形，其中企业使用的合同以买方从竞争对手处购买的产品为条件。我们提出了一种新机制：主导企业通过使用这类合同，从利用竞争对手中获得的收益可以超过将其排除出市场所获得的收益。这种利用的实现方式是，要求买方将其总需求中至少一定比例从主导企业采购，但该比例低于100%。通过最优地设计这些合同，主导企业所能获得的收益，等同于其以零成本获取竞争对手特定技术与营销能力时的收益。（JEL D43, D82, D86, K21, L14, M31）
Abstract
We analyze oligopolistic competition in which firms use contracts contingent on what buyers purchase from their rivals. We present a new mechanism through which a dominant firm, by using these contracts, can gain more from exploiting its rivals than from foreclosing them. This exploitation is achieved by requiring buyers to source at least a certain share of their total requirements from the dominant firm, though less than 100 percent. By optimally designing these contracts, the dominant firm can earn as much as it would if it were to acquire the rivals' specific technological and marketing capabilities at no cost. (JEL D43, D82, D86, K21, L14, M31)