American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Erzo F.P. Luttmer、Priscila de Oliveira、Dmitry Taubinsky
中文摘要
本文利用基于概率抽样的激励实验 (N = 3,038) 研究年金领取中的心理偏差。在实验中, 无论价格如何, 选择年金都是收益最大化的, 但领取并不完全, 且富有价格弹性。将决策重新表述为针对“坏”结果的保险, 而非针对“长寿风险”的保险, 并未提高领取率。相反, 我们发现存在大量条件推理失当: 参与者低估了年金化在多大程度上减轻了对效率较低的退休储蓄手段的需求。提高年金化与储蓄决策之间相互作用的显著性, 或者完全消除思考这一相互作用的必要性, 都会大幅提高年金领取率。NBER 工作论文系列的机构订户以及发展中国家居民可在 www.nber.org 免费下载本文。
Abstract
This paper studies psychological biases in take-up of annuities, using an incentivized experiment with a probability-based sample (N = 3,038). Choosing an annuity was payoff-maximizing in the experiment at all prices, but take-up was incomplete and price elastic. Reformulating decisions as insurance against a “bad” outcome rather than insurance against “longevity risk” did not increase take-up. Instead, we find substantial failures of contingent reasoning: participants under-appreciated how annuitization mitigated the need for less-efficient means of saving for retirement. Increasing the salience of the interaction with savings decisions, or eliminating the need to think through this interaction altogether, substantially increased annuity take-up. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.