中文摘要
本文研究数据提供者的最优设计与销售营销名单问题，这些名单使拥有私人类型的零售商能够接触具有异质性特征的消费者。当虚拟价值满足一种特定形式的凸性（称为边界占优）时，在一定正则条件下，无论零售商的类型是纵向排序还是横向排序，最优机制均包含完全揭示的营销名单。此外，在纵向情形下，最优机制允许一种简单的“固定价格”实施方式；在横向情形下，它具有无排斥与旋转性质。反之，若边界占优不成立，最优机制可能并非完全揭示。(JEL D82, L81, M31)
Abstract
We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple “fixed-price” implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing. (JEL D82, L81, M31)