中文摘要
我们研究不完全信息古诺双寡头博弈中私人信号相关性的误判。当参与者对价格弹性持有灵活信念时,夸大各方需求信号之间的相关性是有益的;而当其信念教条式地正确时,这种夸大则是有害的。对于通过观察价格学习弹性的灵活信念参与者而言,相关性误判会经由弹性误推断间接扭曲行为。若参与者知晓真实弹性,这一学习渠道便被消除。相关性误判对行为具有方向相反的直接效应与间接效应,因此弹性推断的存在可能逆转某一错误的存续性。(JEL C72, D21, D43, D81, D82, D83)
Abstract
We study misperceptions of private-signal correlation in an incomplete-information Cournot duopoly game. Exaggerating the correlation between players' demand signals is beneficial when agents hold flexible beliefs about price elasticity but is harmful when their beliefs are dogmatically correct. For agents with flexible beliefs who learn elasticity by observing prices, correlation misperceptions indirectly distort behavior through elasticity misinference. If agents know the true elasticity, this learning channel is eliminated. Correlation misperceptions have opposite direct and indirect effects on behavior, so the presence of elasticity inference can reverse an error's viability. (JEL C72, D21, D43, D81, D82, D83)