中文摘要
人们参与抗议,尽管参与有成本、收益并非由参与者独享,且每个人都不太可能具有决定性。基于这些特征,我提出一个抗议形成的序贯模型,其中参与机会随机到来,当参与超过某一阈值时抗议即告成功。我证明唯一均衡的存在性并刻画其动态。若唯一均衡涉及参与行为,则随着抗议的推进,各参与决策之间的时间间隔会缩短——这一模式已在实证中被观察到。若一名获得机会的参与者在选择放弃后,抗议很可能在下一个机会到来之前结束,则该参与者便成为序贯意义上的关键人物。(JEL D72, D84, D91)
Abstract
People participate in protests even though it is costly, benefits are not exclusive to participants, and each individual is unlikely to be pivotal. Building on these characteristics, I propose a sequential model of protest formation where opportunities to participate arrive stochastically, and the protest succeeds if participation surpasses a threshold. I show a unique equilibrium exists and characterize its dynamics. If the unique equilibrium involves participation, the time between participation decisions shortens as the protest progresses—a pattern observed empirically. A player with an opportunity becomes sequentially pivotal if, after abstaining, the protest will likely end before another opportunity arrives. (JEL D72, D84, D91)