American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · James P. Choy
中文摘要
一个社会为政治主导社会群体的成员保留特定岗位，以最大化该群体劳动者的工资。通过对保留岗位的恰当选择，主导群体同时决定了保留岗位集合的规模以及保留岗位与非保留岗位之间的替代弹性。最优歧视会内生地创造出“好”岗位与“坏”岗位的类别，并将不同社会群体的劳动者分配到这些不同类别之中。劳动力的相对稀缺程度决定了歧视性安排与自由劳动力市场何者更优。我将该模型应用于种族隔离时期的南非及其他歧视性社会。（JEL H22, J15, J22, J31, J42, J71, N37）
Abstract
A society reserves certain jobs for members of a politically dominant social group to maximize the wages of workers in that group. Through an appropriate choice of reserved jobs, the dominant group chooses both the size of the set of reserved jobs and the elasticity of substitution between reserved and unreserved jobs. Optimal discrimination endogenously creates categories of “good” and “bad” jobs and assigns workers from different social groups into these different categories. The relative scarcity of labor determines whether discrimination or free labor markets are optimal. I apply the model to apartheid South Africa and other discriminatory societies. (JEL H22, J15, J22, J31, J42, J71, N37)