American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Rossi Abi-Rafeh、Pierre Dubois、Rachel Griffith、Martin O’Connell
中文摘要
我们构建了一个企业竞争的动态均衡模型，以分析税收与广告限制等反事实政策对定价、广告、消费和福利的影响。利用微观层面数据，我们估计了消费者接触电视广告如何影响其产品选择，并对企业在广告预算和定价方面的策略性竞争进行建模。我们利用企业将广告时段决策委托给代理机构的做法，将消费者层面的广告变动与企业自身的策略选择联系起来。研究结果表明，含糖饮料税会减少广告投放，而在税收已经存在的情况下，广告限制的额外影响则显著较弱。(JEL D12, D22, H25, L13, L66, L82, M37)
Abstract
We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of firm competition to analyze the effects of counterfactual policies, such as taxes and advertising restrictions, on pricing, advertising, consumption, and welfare. Using micro-level data, we estimate how consumer exposure to television commercials influences product choice and model firms' strategic competition over advertising budgets and pricing. We exploit firms' practice of delegating advertising slot decisions to agencies to link consumer-level advertising variation to firms' strategic choices. Our results show that a sugar-sweetened beverage tax reduces advertising, while the additional impact of advertising restrictions is significantly weaker when a tax is already in place. (JEL D12, D22, H25, L13, L66, L82, M37)