American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2026 · Michael Elsby、Axel Gottfries、Pawel Michal Krolikowski、Gary Solon
中文摘要
本文提出一个模型,其中有效的长期雇佣关系由生产率冲击和外部工作机会所引发的工资调整来维系。由于存在重新谈判成本,这些工资调整只是偶发地发生。该模型可求得解析解,从而为若干劳动力市场现象提供新的洞见,包括:(i) 留职者工资变动的经验分布的关键特征;(ii) 工资动态中的一种近似“无记忆性”性质,即雇佣工资对后续工资与配置决策的影响有限;(iii) 招聘与留任奖金在维系有效雇佣关系中的关键作用。(JEL E24, E31, E32, J31, J64, M51, M52)
Abstract
We present a model in which efficient long-term employment relationships are sustained by wage adjustments prompted by productivity shocks and outside job offers. These wage adjustments occur only sporadically, due to the presence of renegotiation costs. The model is amenable to analytical solution, yielding new insights for several labor market phenomena, including (i) key features of empirical distributions of changes in pay among job stayers, (ii) a near-“memorylessness” property in wage dynamics whereby hiring wages have only limited influence on later wages and allocation decisions, and (iii) a crucial role for recruitment and retention bonuses in sustaining efficient employment relationships. (JEL E24, E31, E32, J31, J64, M51, M52)