From means-tested programs to Universal Basic Income - The role of endogenous participation in transfer programs
中文摘要
本文研究了在劳动所得税抵免 (EITC) 领取不完全的环境下, 以全民基本收入 (UBI) 取代劳动所得税抵免所产生的效应。相比之下, UBI 在制度设计上保证全面参与, 将福利延伸至未领取 EITC 的家庭, 但代价是更高的财政支出。我利用一个包含内生 EITC 参与决策的生命周期模型来研究这一覆盖面扩大与财政成本之间的权衡, 该模型能够复现已观察到的资格认定与领取模式。结果表明, 慷慨的 UBI (每年 12,000 美元) 因其带来的沉重财政负担而降低福利, 而适度规模的 UBI (每年 3,500 美元) 则通过惠及此前未被覆盖的家庭、且仅需适度的财政成本而改善福利。这些发现凸显了项目参与这一边际在评估政策改革中的重要性。
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of replacing the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) with a Universal Basic Income (UBI) in an environment where EITC take-up is incomplete. In contrast, UBI ensures full participation by design, extending benefits to households who do not take up the EITC, at the cost of higher fiscal expenditures. I study this trade-off between expanded coverage and fiscal cost using a life-cycle model with an endogenous EITC participation decision that replicates the observed eligibility and take-up patterns. The results show that a generous UBI ($12,000 annually) reduces welfare due to the substantial fiscal burden it entails, whereas a modest UBI ($3500 per year) improves welfare by reaching previously uncovered households at only a moderate fiscal cost. These findings highlight the importance of the program participation margin in evaluating policy reforms.