中文摘要
更多信息是否能使选民受益？我在分配政治与选举问责的新情境下考察了这一问题。同质信息的选民群体可以通过对政治家控制或筛选的改善，从更少的信息中受益。对于异质信息的选民群体，我表明资源的分配与选民福利受信息异质性的性质以及选民之间相互沟通能力的影响，在某些情况下，信息较少的选民比信息较多的选民境况更好。(JEL D72, D82, D83, H50)
Abstract
Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters’ ability to communicate with each other, making less-informed voters better off than their more-informed counterparts in some cases. (JEL D72, D82, D83, H50)