Central Banks as Dollar Lenders of Last Resort: Implications for Regulation and Reserve Holdings
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2022 · Mitali Das、Gita Gopinath、Helene Hall、Tae-Hoon Kim、Jeremy C. Stein
中文摘要
我们探讨了当企业存在货币错配并大量借入美元时，外国中央银行的行为方式。中央银行可以通过两种途径应对私人部门的风险错配：(i) 实施金融监管，或 (ii) 积累储备以更好地发挥美元最后贷款人的作用。我们揭示了一种新型外部性：各中央银行可能会过度积累美元储备，因为这会加剧美元计价资产的全球短缺，从而降低美元利率，并促使企业进一步增加其货币错配。相较于分散化结果，全球计划者可能更偏好更严格的金融监管与减少的美元储备持有。(JEL E43, E44, E58, F31, F41, G21, G28)
Abstract
We explore how foreign central banks behave when firms engage in currency mismatch, borrowing heavily in dollars. A central bank can deal with risky private-sector mismatch in two ways: (i) with financial regulation or (ii) by accumulating reserves to better serve as a dollar lender of last resort. We highlight a novel externality: Individual central banks may overaccumulate dollar reserves, as this exacerbates a global scarcity of dollar-denominated assets, lowering dollar interest rates and encouraging firms to further increase their currency mismatch. Relative to the decentralized outcome, a global planner may prefer tighter financial regulation and reduced holdings of dollar reserves. (JEL E43, E44, E58, F31, F41, G21, G28)