中文摘要
本文在一个易于处理的均衡框架下考察了易感人群面对致命疾病时的行为。我们解析地刻画了个体最优的缓解行为及其所导致的均衡轨迹，并借助相图进行分析。一个关键洞见是：易感者的个体最优行为会导致过度谨慎。这种行为使传染病曲线变得平缓，并延长了疫情持续时间。相比之下，社会最优行为导致更高的感染率，其重点在于以最小成本最小化累计死亡人数。本文提供了新的技术性贡献，并增进了对经济—流行病学 (econ-epi) 模型中外部性的理解。(JEL D62, D91, I12, I18)
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of individuals susceptible to a deadly disease in a tractable equilibrium setting. We analytically characterize individually optimal mitigation behavior and the resulting equilibrium trajectory. Analysis is facilitated by a phase diagram. A key insight is that individually optimal behavior of those susceptible to the disease results in excessive caution. This behavior flattens the epidemic curve and prolongs the epidemic. In contrast, socially optimal behavior results in a higher infection rate, with a focus on minimizing cumulative deaths at minimum cost. The paper offers novel technical contributions and an improved understanding of externalities in econ-epi models. (JEL D62, D91, I12, I18)