American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2026 · Titan Alon、Damien Capelle、Kazushige Matsuda
中文摘要
本文构建了一个框架,在这一框架中,大学研究内生地取决于高等教育市场中对学费与优秀学生的竞争。当学生高度分层分布于不同院校之间,或学费随学校排名急剧上升时,即便研究对教学的直接贡献很小,大学仍会在研发上投入。该模型与因果证据相符,并与微观数据的新特征相匹配。它解释了为何在专利回报微不足道的情况下,大学仍以学费收入为研究提供内部资助。校准模拟表明,现行学费政策会提升大学研究,而研究补贴则会将其挤出。(JEL I22, I23, L24, O31, O34)
Abstract
This paper develops a framework in which university research depends endogenously on competition for tuition and talented students in the market for higher education. When students are highly stratified across colleges, or when tuition rises sharply with school rank, universities spend on R&D even if the direct contribution of research to teaching is small. The model is consistent with causal evidence and matches new features of the microdata. It explains why universities internally fund research with tuition, despite negligible returns to patenting. Calibrated simulations suggest that existing tuition policies boost university research while research subsidies crowd it out. (JEL I22, I23, L24, O31, O34)