中文摘要
粗糙认证提供关于质量的简单但不完整的信息，其主要理据在于帮助消费者在复杂且缺乏显著性的质量维度之间进行权衡。在不完全竞争市场中，它可能诱发在认证要求处的过度聚集、挤出高质量产品，并为价格歧视提供便利。因此，谁最终能从粗糙认证中获益，既取决于企业所能行使的市场势力大小，也取决于消费者应对此类信息的精明程度。本文以“能源之星”认证计划为案例阐释了这些洞见。我运用美国家电市场的结构计量模型考察了该计划的归宿。研究发现，该认证可能挤出能效、使消费者境况恶化，并对企业利润产生较小但异质的影响。在这一情境下，该认证往往不能带来福利改善。然而，这一结论关键取决于市场环境与政策设计——在能源价格较低或认证要求极为严格的情形下，“能源之星”计划能够改善福利。
Abstract
A coarse certification provides simple, but incomplete information about quality. Its main rationale is to help consumers trade off dimensions of quality that are complex and lack salience. In imperfectly competitive markets, it may induce excess bunching at the certification requirement, crowd out high quality, and facilitate price discrimination. Who will ultimately benefit from a coarse certification thus depends on the degree of market power firms can exercise as well as on consumers’ sophistication in responding to such information. This paper illustrates these insights using the ENERGY STAR certification program as a case study. I investigate the incidence of the program with a structural econometric model of the U.S. appliance market. I find that the certification can crowd out energy efficiency, make consumers worst off, and have small, but heterogenous impacts on firms’ profits. In this context, the certification tends to not be welfare-improving. This conclusion, however, crucially depends on the market environment and the design of the policy - in scenarios where energy prices are low, or the certification requirement is very stringent, the ES program can be welfare-improving.