中文摘要
季节性迁移是缓解农村季节性匮乏的常见策略，但移民需要在青黄不接的季节向面临粮食短缺的家庭成员汇款。我们在尼泊尔农村观察到，在季节性饥荒时期汇款出乎意料地低，而移民在收获期较晚时带着汇款返回，此时粮食相对充裕。为了间接克服汇款时机上的这一明显约束，我们在收获前的青黄不接季节向随机选定的农村家庭提供了一笔90美元的消费贷款。获得贷款的家庭增加了收获前对化肥的投资以及在自有农场上投入的劳动时间，平滑了消费，并将更多的迁移收入储蓄起来带回家。粮食安全、主观幸福感、水稻收成和收入均有所改善。98%的受益者用收获期增加的汇款偿还了贷款。在一个两期家庭决策模型中，我们表明汇款摩擦——一种市场失灵——对于在定性上匹配我们的实验结果而言是必要的。
Abstract
Seasonal migration is a common strategy to mitigate rural seasonal deprivation, but migrants need to remit money during the lean season to family members facing food shortages. We observe counterintuitively low remittances in rural Nepal during periods of seasonal hunger, and migrants return with remittances later during harvest when food is relatively abundant. To indirectly overcome this apparent constraint in remittance timing, we provide a $90 consumption loan to randomly selected rural households during the pre‐harvest lean season. Loan‐recipient households increase pre‐harvest investments in fertilizer and time spent working on their own farm, smooth consumption, and save more of their migration income to bring it back home. Food security, subjective well‐being, rice harvest, and revenues improve. Ninety‐eight percent of beneficiaries repay the loan with the increased harvest‐period remittance. In a two‐period model of household decision making, we show that remittance frictions—a market failure—are necessary to qualitatively match our experimental results.