如何提高小企业的工薪税遵从度？来自一项随机田野实验的证据

中文摘要

企业逃缴工薪税的现象十分普遍，威胁着福利体系，但人们对如何遏制这一行为知之甚少。本文报告一项针对中等收入国家小企业的随机对照试验的结果。我们在企业层面随机分配所公告的稽查概率（1%、10%、40% 或 60%），并实施若干新型道德劝诫（强调由税收筹资提供的物品）。研究表明，威慑措施与道德措施均能改善工薪税遵从度。更高的稽查概率比道德劝诫多产生 50% 的额外收入。一项采用模糊稽查概率的附加处理表明，行为因素在威慑效应中所起的作用有限。

Abstract

Payroll tax evasion by firms is widespread and threatens welfare systems, yet little is known about how to combat it. We report results from a randomized control trial targeting small firms in a middle-income country. We randomize announced audit probabilities (1%, 10%, 40%, or 60%) on the firm level and implement several novel types of moral appeals (emphasizing tax-financed goods). We show that both deterrence and moral measures improve payroll tax compliance. Higher audit probabilities generate 50% more additional revenues than moral appeals. An additional treatment with ambiguous audit probability shows that behavioral factors play a limited role in deterrence effects.