Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries
中文摘要
我们开展了一项以雇佣合同为情境框架的互动式在线实验。来自美国、印度和非洲的被试在国内以及跨国之间进行匹配。雇主向一名工人发出单期要约，工人可以拒绝该要约，也可以选择高努力或低努力。要约被限定于一组可变的候选合同集合之内。高努力始终是有效率的。部分观察到的选择能被自利偏好很好地预测，但另一些则更适合用条件互惠或内在动机来解释。来自印度和非洲的被试遵循内在动机，更常提供高努力。美国被试更可能遵循自利偏好，平均而言达到的效率结果较低，但工人收入略高。我们没有发现存在跨国刻板印象的证据。个体特征以及被试对工人激励所陈述的态度无法预测国家之间观察到的行为差异，这与各国对劳动激励的反应存在文化差异的解释相符。
Abstract
We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic motivation. Subjects from India and Africa follow intrinsic motivation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest and reach a less efficient outcome on average, but workers earn slightly more. We find no evidence of stereotypes across countries. Individual characteristics and stated attitudes toward worker incentives do not predict the behavioral differences observed between countries, consistent with cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.