How Congress Designed the Federal Reserve to Be Independent of Presidential Control
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2025 · Richardson, Gary、Wilcox, David W.
中文摘要
传统观点将美联储独立性的起源追溯至1951年的财政部—美联储协议。这一历史叙述并不准确。美联储货币政策独立性的主要来源是《1935年银行法》, 该法创建了美联储的现代领导架构, 并使货币政策决策不受总统控制。在这一案例中, 国会的意图是明确的, 因为该法案的初始草案曾将货币政策的控制权授予总统。经过广泛辩论之后, 国会修改了该立法, 并精心设计了确立美联储独立性的制度特征。《1935年银行法》的核心作用表明, 只有国会立法或最高法院的裁决才能从根本上增强总统对货币政策的影响力。
Abstract
Conventional wisdom traces the origins of the Federal Reserve's independence to the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord. That rendition of history is inaccurate. The principal source of the Fed's monetary-policy independence is the Banking Act of 1935, which created the Fed's modern leadership structure and placed monetary-policy decisions beyond Presidential control. Congressional intent is clear in this case because the initial draft of the bill vested control of monetary policy with the President. After extensive debate, Congress amended the legislation and crafted the institutional features that enshrine the Fed's independence. The central role of the Banking Act of 1935 suggests that only an act of Congress or a Supreme Court ruling could fundamentally strengthen presidential influence over monetary policy.