中文摘要
利用受控实验室实验,我们考察财务报告监管——对盈余管理的限制与审计——如何影响披露质量与市场效率。我们的发现表明,严格的限制与审计的可能性会提高盈余披露的信息含量,从而改善定价效率;而宽松的限制则会恶化披露质量与定价效率。财务报告监管通过约束盈余管理行为和诱发信号传递行为来提高披露质量。审计通过抑制操纵能更有效地提升社会福利,而限制则会引发对昂贵信号的过度投资。我们的结果还有助于解释此前关于财务报告监管的相互矛盾的经验发现。
Abstract
Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine how financial reporting regulations—limits on earnings management and auditing—affect disclosure quality and market efficiency. Our findings indicate that a tight limit and the possibility of an audit enhance the informativeness of earnings disclosures, leading to improved pricing efficiency while a weak limit deteriorates disclosure quality and pricing efficiency. Financial reporting regulations enhance disclosure quality via both constraining earnings management practices and inducing signaling behavior. Auditing more effectively boosts social welfare by suppressing manipulation, whereas limits trigger overinvestment in costly signal. Our results also shed light on previously contradictory empirical findings regarding financial reporting regulations.