Incentivizing Mass Creativity: An Empirical Study of the Online Publishing Market
中文摘要
本研究考察激励方案对创意产出数量与质量的影响。我们考察了一个连载出版平台，该平台从统一佣金（UC）方案转向基于产量的佣金（QBC）方案，当作者产量达到预设门槛时可获得额外的佣金率。我们的分析显示，就同一本书而言，作者在达到预设门槛产量从而获得额外佣金率的月份所发布的章节质量更高，质量以章节间的客户留存率来衡量。对于在统一佣金方案下出版的书籍，这种正相关并不显著。我们将其解读为：基于产量的佣金方案的实施增强了作者收益函数中数量与质量之间的互补性。进一步的实证分析表明，这一效应随时间持续存在。此外，对于从多本书中赚取佣金的作者而言，互补性增强的程度较低。当以读者评论情感来衡量质量时，我们的核心结论依然稳健。总体而言，研究结果凸显了精心设计的激励在增强平台管理大众创造力效果方面的关键作用。
Abstract
This study examines the effects of incentive plans on the quantity and quality of creative production. We examine a serial publishing platform that switched from a uniform commission (UC) plan to a quantity-based commission (QBC) plan offering a bonus commission rate when writers’ production meets a preset threshold. Our analysis reveals that, for a given book, chapters published in the months when writers reached the preset threshold quantity, and thus earned bonus commission rates, exhibited higher quality, as measured by the chapter-to-chapter customer retention rate. Such a positive correlation was nonsignificant for books published under the UC plan. We interpret that the implementation of a QBC plan enhanced the complementarity between quantity and quality in the writers’ payoff function. Further empirical analysis shows that this effect persisted over time. Moreover, the degree of enhanced complementarity was lower for writers who earned commissions from multiple books. Our key result remains robust when measuring quality by reader comments sentiment. Overall, the findings underscore the critical role of well-designed incentives in enhancing the platform’s effectiveness in managing mass creativity.