← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

项目网络与再配置外部性

Project Networks and Reallocation Externalities
Management Science · 2025 · Vibhuti Dhingra、Harish Krishnan、Juan Camilo Serpa

中文摘要

一个项目涉及多个参与方——包括客户、承包商和分包商——它们在多个项目上并行工作并在其间配置资源。这种相互依赖关系形成了一个由原本互不相关的项目构成的网络。我们绘制了涉及逾 15 万个参与方的美国政府项目网络。我们表明,一个看似局部性的扰动,即便仅影响一个项目现场,最终也会导致不相关项目出现延误。这是因为参与方会机会主义地将资源重新配置到受扰动的项目中,以牺牲其他项目为代价,从而在网络中引发进一步再配置的多米诺效应。因此,现场扰动的成本最终由网络中的多个参与方分担,而非完全由受影响的项目吸收。以绩效为基础的激励措施会因时效性而奖励承包商,从而通过鼓励自利的资源再配置而加剧这些外部性。

Abstract

A project involves several participants—including clients, contractors, and subcontractors—that work concurrently on multiple projects and allocate resources among them. This interdependency creates a network of otherwise-unrelated projects. We map the network of U.S. government projects involving over 150,000 participants. We show that a seemingly localized disruption, affecting only one project site, eventually causes delays across unrelated projects. This is because participants opportunistically reallocate resources into disrupted projects, at the expense of other projects, triggering a domino effect of further reallocations in the network. Thus, the costs of on-site disruptions end up being shared by multiple participants in the network, rather than being fully absorbed by the affected project. Performance-based incentives, which reward contractors for timeliness, exacerbate these externalities by encouraging self-interested resource reallocation.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →