Consequences of Performance-Enhancing Misconduct: Insights from Professional Road Cycling, 2000–2010
中文摘要
我们利用一个观测2000年至2011年所有车队成员的数据集，考察了卷入使用提高成绩药物（兴奋剂）的职业自行车手所经历的职业生涯后果，以及其队友与车队经理所承受的溢出效应。我们的数据捕捉了公开已知的兴奋剂相关牵连，其范围从媒体披露的非正式怀疑到反兴奋剂与执法机构的正式定罪。我们这一独特情境的特征在于：尽管存在严格的反兴奋剂监管制度与密切的媒体审视，人们仍预期兴奋剂使用普遍存在；这为理解竞争性行业中行为主体如何评估极端成绩压力与遵守规则这两种相互竞争的要求的多层次方式，提供了新视角。我们发现，只有最严重的规则违规与车手的职业生涯中断相关联，较轻的违规则不然。较为模糊的兴奋剂案例——即基于非正式怀疑或受到适度处罚的正式定罪的案例——主要与该项运动高绩效明星的职业生涯中断相关联。与以往关于同伴不当行为溢出效应的大多数研究相反，我们发现，在队友因兴奋剂被定罪之后，大多数车手面临职业生涯中断的风险反而更低——我们将这一效应归因于一种审查过程：监管者主动将同伴列为加强监控的对象，从而消除了关于同伴是否使用兴奋剂的不确定性。关于对经理职业生涯的溢出效应，我们发现，只有表明重大车队丑闻的极端程度的正式定罪，才与经理职业生涯中断风险上升相关联。总体而言，我们的结果表明，在竞争性行业中，尽管存在严格的监控与执法，行业层面的激励结构仍支持不当行为的普遍存在。
Abstract
We explore the career consequences experienced by professional cyclists implicated in performance-enhancing drug use as well the spillover effects experienced by their teammates and managers using a data set that observes members of all teams from 2000 to 2011. Our data captures publicly known doping implications that range from informal suspicions published in the media to formal convictions by antidoping and law enforcement authorities. Our unique setting, characterized by expectations of widespread doping despite a rigorous antidoping regulatory regime and close media scrutiny, provides a new perspective on the multilayered ways that actors in competitive industries assess the competing demands of extreme performance pressures versus playing by the rules. We find that only the most severe rules violations are associated with career interruptions for riders, whereas lesser offenses are not. More ambiguous cases of doping, those based on informal suspicion or moderately punished formal convictions, are associated with career interruptions primarily for the sport’s high-performing stars. In contrast to most prior work on spillover effects from peer misconduct, we find that most riders are at a lower risk of career interruptions following teammates’ doping convictions—an effect we attribute to a vetting process in which regulators proactively target peers for increased monitoring, which resolves uncertainties about peers’ doping. Regarding spillover effects on managers’ careers, we find that only extreme levels of formal convictions that signal major team scandals are associated with increased risk of managerial career interruptions. Together, our results suggest an industry-level incentive structure that supports widespread misconduct in a competitive industry despite rigorous monitoring and enforcement.