中文摘要
平台运营的市场可能利用第三方卖家的数据开发竞争性产品,但未来竞争的威胁会阻碍卖家进入。我们探讨这种权衡如何影响平台自身进入该市场以及其向第三方卖家收取的引荐费。我们首先刻画平台在对自身进入政策的不同承诺程度下的最优费用。我们表明,完全承诺不仅使平台收益最大化,也使消费者剩余最大化,因为与之相关的费用会促使卖家最大程度地进入。接着,我们展示平台关于其市场部门与产品部门之间信息共享的政策如何以及何时能够替代其进入承诺。我们刻画平台的最优信息政策,并考察其如何与平台的费用结构相互作用。我们表明,全面禁止平台内部部门之间的信息共享可能降低消费者福利,因为这可能导致更高的引荐费,从而阻碍卖家进入。我们的发现凸显了在市场监管政策辩论中,将平台费用结构视为一种策略性回应加以考虑的重要性。
Abstract
Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers’ data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers’ entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform’s entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform’s optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform’s payoff but also consumer surplus, as the associated fee induces maximal entry by the sellers. Next, we show how and when the platform’s policy on information sharing between its marketplace and product divisions can substitute for its commitment to entry. We characterize the platform’s optimal information policy and examine how it interacts with the platform’s fee structure. We show that an outright ban on information sharing between the platform’s divisions can reduce consumer welfare as it may lead to a higher referral fee that thwarts sellers’ entry. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the platform’s fee structure as a strategic response in the policy debates on marketplace regulation.