中文摘要
在主权债务危机期间,债务国之间是否应该相互支持?我们通过一个校准于欧元区外围国家的两国主权违约模型来回答这一问题。首先,我们考察跨国救助。我们发现,只要经济主体预期到救助,救助就会引致更高的借款,但仍能增进福利。其次,我们考察一个全球性中央借款人的借款选择。我们发现,中央借款人的政策能够降低债务并改善两国的联合福利。然而,福利收益并不均匀。在我们的基准设定中,在计划者规则下,两国之一出现福利下降。我们的结论是,中央计划者政策在政治上可能不可行。
Abstract
Should debtor countries support each other during sovereign debt crises? We answer this question through the lens of a two-country sovereign-default model that we calibrate to the euro-area periphery. First, we look at cross-country bailouts. We find that whenever agents anticipate them, bailouts induce higher borrowings, and yet still enhance welfare. Second, we look at the borrowing choices of a global central borrower. We find that central borrower’s policies reduce debt and improve the joint welfare of the two countries. Yet, welfare gains are uneven. In our baseline specification, one of the two countries sees a decline of welfare under the planner’s rules. We conclude that central planner policies may be politically unfeasible.