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儿童为什么会在蜈蚣博弈中选择传递?认知局限与风险计算之争

Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations
Games and Economic Behavior · 2025 · Brocas, Isabelle、Carrillo, Juan D.

中文摘要

8至16岁的儿童和青少年在实验室中参与蜈蚣博弈,其中非均衡行为(传递)可能出于两种原因:无法进行逆向归纳(认知局限),或决定对经验风险做出最优反应并承担经过权衡的风险(行为上的老练)。我们发现,逻辑能力是逐步发展的。尽管年幼参与者(如预期的那样)最不可能进行逆向归纳,但那些进行逆向归纳的参与者往往高估同龄人做出类似行为的能力。随着年龄增长,参与者逐渐学会进行策略性思考,并对关于他人的信念做出最优反应。总体而言,蜈蚣博弈是研究能力发展的理想测试案例,因为它能够区分年幼儿童与青少年选择传递的原因。有趣的是,精明并未转化为收益,并且我们首次记录了一种策略博弈,其中收益随年龄增长单调下降。

Abstract

Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the ability of their peers to behave similarly. With age, participants gradually learn to think strategically and to best respond to their beliefs about others. Overall, the centipede game is an ideal test case for studying the development of abilities, as it disentangles the causes for passing in young children and in teenagers. Interestingly, shrewdness does not transform into earnings, and we document for the first time a game of strategy where payoffs monotonically decrease with age.
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