Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences
Games and Economic Behavior · 2025 · Chen, Haoning、Dong, Miaomiao、Henry, Marc、Sidorov, Ivan
中文摘要
我们提出一个劳动力市场部门自选择模型, 该模型将 Roy 模型中的比较优势与部门构成偏好相结合。两类群体依据异质性的潜在收入与各部门内的群体构成, 在两个部门之间做出选择。潜在收入包含群体特有的人力资本积累与工资歧视。构成偏好被解释为反映了群体特定的舒适度偏好, 以及同质性偏好和对少数地位的反感。我们证明职业隔离会被构成偏好所放大, 并揭示了由此产生的再分配与多样性之间的张力。该模型还表现出从极端构成向更均衡构成的倾覆 (tipping)。当与平权行动相关联的一个微小推动使系统跃迁至一个截然不同的均衡时, 或当决定货币偏好与构成偏好相对重要性的参数越过某一阈值从而使均衡集合发生突变时, 倾覆便会发生。
Abstract
We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minority status. We show that occupational segregation is amplified by the composition preferences and we highlight a resulting tension between redistribution and diversity. The model also exhibits tipping from extreme compositions to more balanced ones. Tipping occurs when a small nudge, associated with affirmative action, pushes the system to a very different equilibrium, and when the set of equilibria changes abruptly when a parameter governing the relative importance of pecuniary and composition preferences crosses a threshold.