中文摘要
我们表明，理性的利润最大化企业可能发现对女性实施工资歧视是最优的，即使女性与男性在所有方面都相同。具体而言，我们认为，工资差距可以自然地作为对女性的歧视而出现，因为歧视首先可以内生地影响劳动供给弹性，并能使男性的劳动供给弹性变小、女性的劳动供给弹性变大。此外，我们指出，一旦这种弹性的内生变化出现，它实际上使歧视成为最优，并使歧视得以在均衡中实现。而且，我们表明，对女性的歧视有损整体福利，此外还对男性的工资产生负面影响。因此，我们认为，同工同酬强制规定将使两性都受益，因为在我们的模型中，女性与男性之间不存在张力，而是雇主对劳动者剩余的内生攫取。本文描述的关键机制自然地可扩展至产品市场，并可为普遍存在的“粉红税”提供合理化解释。
Abstract
We show that rational profit maximizing firms can find it optimal to wage discriminate against females even though females and males are identical in all respects. Specifically, we argue that a pay gap can emerge naturally as discrimination against females, in the first place, can endogenously affect the elasticity of labor supply and can make the supply of labor of males less elastic and the supply of labor of females more elastic. Furthermore, we note that once this endogenous change in elasticity emerges it in fact makes discrimination optimal and allows discrimination to materialize in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that discrimination against females is detrimental to the overall welfare and in addition it negatively affects wages of males. Consequently, we argue that an equal pay mandate would benefit both genders as in our model there is no tension between females and males, but there is an endogenous extraction of surplus from workers by employers. The key mechanism described in the paper extends naturally to the product markets and can serve as rationalization of the prevalent pink-tax.