Games and Economic Behavior · 2025 · Atay, Ata、Mauleon, Ana、Vannetelbosch, Vincent
中文摘要
我们考察具有远见学生的基于优先权的择校问题。我们证明,由顶端交易循环(Top Trading Cycles, TTC)机制得到的匹配所构成的单点集是一个远见稳定集。然而,由延迟接受(Deferred Acceptance, DA)机制得到的匹配可能不属于任何远见稳定集。因此,TTC 机制所给出的配置不仅帕累托有效,而且是远见稳定的。此外,只需向前看三步,便足以使由 TTC 得到的匹配实现稳定。另外,我们还证明,在无合理嫉妒方面有所改进的 TTC 变体是远见稳定的,但可能要求学生具备更强的远见。
Abstract
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.