中文摘要
Gale-Shapley (盖尔—沙普利) 算法是世界上最流行的大学名额分配机制之一。在这一机制设定下, 一个关键的政策问题是如何设计学生的录取优先顺序, 理解其如何使某些人口群体处于不利地位, 以及这些差异是否与大学学业表现潜力的差异有关。通过研究西班牙的一项政策变化, 我们发现提高标准化高利害考试的权重对女性大学录取成绩产生负向影响, 且这一影响主要由预期处于顶尖水平的学生所驱动。对录取成绩的影响并未改变入学情况, 但选拔性最强的学位项目中女生所占的比例下降, 其职业前景也随之下降。利用改革前各届学生大学表现的数据, 我们发现最有可能因改革受损的女生在大学中的表现往往好于预期从改革中受益的男生。结果表明, 在选拔过程中奖励高利害考试表现, 可能伴随着与后续表现决定因素无关的性别差异。
Abstract
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is one of the most popular college allocation mechanisms around the world. A crucial policy question in its setting is designing admission priorities for students, understanding how they disadvantage certain demographic groups, and whether these differences relate to differences in college performance potential. Studying a policy change in Spain, we find a negative effect of increasing the weight of standardized high-stakes exams on female college admission grades, driven by students expected to be at the top. The impact on admission grades does not affect enrollment, but the percentage of female students in the most selective degrees declines, along with their career prospects. Using data on the college performance of prereform cohorts, we find that female students most likely to lose from the reform tend to do better in college than male students expected to benefit from the reform. The results show that rewarding high-stakes performance in selection processes may come along with gender differences unrelated to the determinants of subsequent performance.