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中心化加密货币交易所之间的交易量操纵与竞争

Trading Volume Manipulation and Competition Among Centralized Crypto Exchanges
Management Science · 2025 · Dan Amiram、Evgeny Lyandres、Daniel Rabetti

中文摘要

竞争如何影响企业对产品重要属性信息的操纵,以及这种信息操纵如何影响企业的短期与长期绩效,仍是尚未解决的实证问题。我们采用一个特别适合回答这些问题的情境——中心化加密货币交易所,在这些交易所中,信息操纵表现为夸大交易量。我们发现,静态和动态竞争指标与交易量虚增呈正相关,表明竞争可能导致信息操纵增加。操纵交易量的交易所获得了短期收益,但在长期受到惩罚,这与短期租金增加和因声誉受损而导致未来损失之间的权衡相一致。

Abstract

How competition affects manipulation by firms of information about important attributes of their products and how such information manipulation impacts firms’ short-term and long-term performance are open empirical questions. We use a setting that is especially suitable for answering these questions—centralized crypto exchanges, on which information manipulation takes the form of inflated trading volume. We find that static and dynamic competition measures are positively associated with volume inflation, indicating that competition may lead to increased information manipulation. Exchanges that manipulate volume obtain short-run benefits but are punished in the long run, consistent with the trade-off between short-lived increases in rents and future losses because of damaged reputation.
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