Antisocial Responses to the “Coal to Gas” Regulation: An Unintended Consequence of a Residential Energy Policy
中文摘要
旨在改善环境和经济的政策可能在意料之外地在其他维度带来负面后果。这类情况为致力于提供全面且合理政策评估的经济学家和政策制定者敲响了警钟。本文研究村民对清洁冬季取暖政策（CWHP）的反社会行为反应，该政策旨在改善室外空气质量。我们的结果表明，参与政策的村民更可能违法焚烧农业废弃物，并且在有激励的独裁者博弈和公共品博弈中表现出更低的亲社会性。我们进一步探讨处理的异质性，发现两条渠道可能发挥了作用。第一，清洁冬季取暖政策被感知为一种负向收入冲击，因此村民会希望减少其在秸秆处理上的支出，并在有激励的博弈中表现得没那么慷慨。第二，清洁冬季取暖政策可能引发不满，并直接影响社会偏好。其他证据表明，若提供更大的前期补贴，这些反社会（亲社会性较低）的反应本可避免。
Abstract
Policies geared toward environmental and economic improvement could unexpectedly lead to negative consequences in other dimensions. Such cases raise a red flag to economists and policymakers who aim to deliver comprehensive and sensible policy evaluations. This article investigates antisocial behaviors in response to the Clean Winter Heating Policy (CWHP), which seeks to improve outdoor air quality. Our results show that participating villagers are more likely to violate laws to burn agricultural waste and exhibit lower prosociality in incentivized dictator games and public goods games. We further explore treatment heterogeneities and find that two channels are likely to play a part. First, the CWHP was perceived as a negative income shock. Therefore, the villagers would want to reduce their expenditure on straw disposal and behave less generously in the incentivized games. Second, the CWHP could trigger discontent and directly affect social preference. Additional evidence suggests that the antisocial (less prosocial) responses could have been avoided by granting larger upfront subsidies.