中文摘要
更多的竞争是缓解大型科技平台支配地位的关键吗?对此类市场的监管是否会成为更好的替代方案?我们研究平台市场中竞争与互操作性监管的效应。为此,我们提出一种基于净费用的竞争方法,该方法非常适用于用户在加入后为平台内互动支付额外费用的情形。与现有方法相比,净费用模型将可处理的分析范围扩展至允许总需求可变、平台不对称以及并购分析。关于竞争,我们发现向市场增加更多平台可能导致支配性企业的出现。相反,我们发现互操作性可以在降低市场支配地位和降低价格方面发挥关键作用。总体而言,我们的结果支持那些确保支配性平台所面对的竞争足够强劲的政策干预。
Abstract
Is more competition the key to mitigating dominance by large tech platforms? Could regulation of such markets be a better alternative? We study the effects of competition and interoperability regulation in platform markets. To do so, we propose an approach of competition in net fees, which is well-suited to situations in which users pay additional charges, after joining, for on-platform interactions. Compared with existing approaches, the net fee model expands the tractable scope to allow variable total demand, platform asymmetry, and merger analysis. Regarding competition, we find that adding more platforms to the market may lead to the emergence of a dominant firm. In contrast, we find that interoperability can play a key role in reducing market dominance and lowering prices. Broadly speaking, our results favor policy interventions that assure the formidability of the competition that dominant platforms face.