中文摘要
本文研究品类队长制,这是一种纵向关系,即零售商将整个产品品类的货架摆放与定价决策委托给该品类内某一家领先制造商。这类合同涉及零售商给予某些品牌的优待。然而,此类合同是保密的,实证分析一直较为有限。为研究这类合同的普遍程度及其福利影响,我开发了一种新方法,根据货架摆放和定价方面的优待来推断队长合同的存在。我首先根据从需求模型中推断出的品牌×零售商特定的货架摆放质量,将零售商划分为不同的队长制类型。随后我进行定价检验,发现与理论预测和行业轶事相一致,品类队长会消除自身产品的双重加价,但不会消除竞争对手产品的双重加价。比较静态分析表明,队长关系会提高队长的市场份额,但由于消除了队长产品上的双重加价,也可能使消费者福利提高约 5%。
Abstract
This paper studies category captaincy, a vertical relationship where retailers delegate shelf placement and pricing decisions of an entire product category to one of the leading manufacturers within that category. These contracts involve preferential treatment given to certain brands within the retailer. However, they are confidential, and empirical analysis has been limited. To study the prevalence and welfare impact of these contracts, I develop a novel approach to infer the presence of captaincy contracts based on preferential treatment in shelf placement and pricing. I first classify retailers into different captaincy types based on a brand × retailer specific quality of shelf placement inferred from a demand model. I then conduct pricing tests and find that captains, in line with theoretical predictions and industry anecdotes, eliminate double markups from their own products but not from competitor products. Comparative statics show that captaincy relationships increase the market share of the captain, but they can also increase consumer welfare by about 5% due to the elimination of double markups on the captain’s products.