Management Science · 2025 · Nirupama Kulkarni、S. K. Ritadhi、Siddharth Vij、Katherine Waldock
中文摘要
能够提高贷款人向财务困境借款人追偿债权能力的破产改革,可以缓解僵尸信贷问题。然而,我们的研究表明,在印度2016年破产改革之后,贷款人不愿将僵尸信贷确认为不良,从而阻碍了改革成效的发挥。随后出台的一项补充性监管规定,针对贷款人确认不良资产的自主权,使僵尸信贷的认定提高到原来的五倍。贷款人确认僵尸信贷的动机不足,源于资本不足的银行不愿实现贷款损失,以及国有银行中的政治经济学摩擦。化解僵尸信贷能使贷款人将信贷重新配置给健康的借款人,但在僵尸借款人敞口较大的银行,这一效应较为有限。
Abstract
Bankruptcy reforms that improve lenders’ ability to recover claims from financially distressed borrowers can mitigate zombie lending. However, we show that after a 2016 bankruptcy reform in India, lenders are reluctant to recognize zombie credit as nonperforming, impeding reform efficacy. A subsequent complementary regulation targeting lender discretion in recognizing nonperforming assets improves zombie recognition fivefold. The lender disincentive to recognize zombies arises from undercapitalized banks’ reluctance to realize loan losses and political economy frictions at state-owned banks. Resolving zombie credit allows lenders to redirect credit to healthy borrowers, but effects are muted at banks more exposed to zombie borrowers.