Management Science · 2025 · Ronald W. Masulis、Sichen Shen、Hong Zou
中文摘要
本文研究法律责任保护是否有助于公司招募和留任高质量独立董事。我们利用1999年美国联邦第九巡回上诉法院对 Silicon Graphics 案的裁决作为冲击——该裁决大幅提高了提起证券集体诉讼(SCA)的门槛——进行双重差分分析。我们记录了支持人才吸引假说的证据:裁决后新招募独立董事的质量有所提升,但这仅适用于此前未暴露于证券集体诉讼风险的候选人。对于事前面临更高诉讼风险的公司,或本地董事候选人供给较少的公司,该效应更强。结果在基于经验的质量维度上更为明显。我们还分析了独立董事自愿离任的样本,几乎未发现支持人才留任假说的证据,这表明一旦董事已暴露于证券集体诉讼风险,其是否留任的决策将涉及更复杂的因素。一个政策含义是:责任保护有助于吸引更多未暴露的高质量候选人进入上市公司董事会人才库,但对于吸引已经身处上市公司人才库中的高质量候选人则作用甚微。
Abstract
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but does little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms.