Management Science · 2025 · Huaizhi Chen、Lauren H. Cohen、Weiling Liu
中文摘要
95%的长期市政债券具有可赎回条款,然而,我们发现新的证据表明,相当一部分地方政府在行使这些有价值的期权时并非最优,存在显著延误——并因此造成巨额损失。利用2001年至2019年的数据,我们估计美国市政债券因再融资延误损失超过260亿美元,而面临同样低利率环境的美国整个企业部门仅损失了相对较小的14亿美元。我们提供的证据表明,这些延误与本地化债务监督方面的缺口有关。例如,当债券赎回权生效的月份恰逢地方政府的财政年度末——财务部门此时格外繁忙——赎回决策的延误显著更长。当市政当局面临大量赎回同时集中到期时,延误也显著更长。这些效应在财务部门人员规模较小的较小市政当局中被放大。此外,外部监督市场(如承销商)是碎片化的。其特征是极强的粘性;在我们的样本期内,市政当局87%的债券由同一家承销商发行。使用不那么聚焦本地的承销商与显著更大的延误相关。
Abstract
Ninety-five percent of long-term municipal bonds have callable features, and yet, we find new evidence of a substantial fraction of local governments exercising these valuable options suboptimally, with significant delays—resulting in sizable losses. Using data from 2001 to 2019, we estimate that U.S. municipals lost over $26 billion from delayed refinancing, whereas the entire U.S. corporate sector, facing the same low interest-rate environment, lost only a comparatively modest $1.4 billion. We present evidence that these delays are related to gaps in localized debt monitoring. For instance, when a bond becomes callable in a month that is the fiscal year end of a local government—a particularly busy time for finance departments—the decision to call is delayed significantly longer. A significantly longer delay also occurs when a municipality is faced with waves of calls all coming due at once. These effects are magnified in smaller municipalities staffed with smaller finance departments. Moreover, the market for outside monitoring (e.g., underwriters) is a fractured one. It is characterized by extreme stickiness; 87% of a municipality’s bonds are issued with the same underwriter over our sample period. The usage of a less locally focused underwriter is associated with significantly greater delays.