How Allowing a Little Bit of Dissent Helps Control Social Media: Impact of Market Structure on Censorship Compliance
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2025 · [{"name": "Z. Jessie Liu", "affiliation": ["Johns Hopkins University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文通过一个独特的实证案例——中国三大直播平台通过内容删除进行审查——研究市场结构在监管合规中的作用。基于30起突发敏感事件，我首先给出简化式证据：最大平台平均审查的关键词数量更多、合规速度也更快，均超过较小平台。随后，我构建并估计了一个结构模型，在该模型中，三个平台通过选择是否遵从政府的审查要求来争夺用户。若立即合规，平台可能会失去那些偏好通过切换平台来规避审查的用户；若延迟合规，平台将承担法律成本，但延迟能使其从迅速遵从政府审查要求的竞争对手那里吸引新用户。我的反事实分析预测：若合规性较低的小平台被关闭或与中型平台合并，由于战略激励增强，剩余平台在均衡中的合规频率可能会降低。这表明，分散线上市场势力或许有助于威权政府管控社交媒体。
Abstract
Abstract This paper studies the role of market structure in regulatory compliance through a unique empirical example: censorship via content removal by three major live-streaming platforms in China. Based on 30 unexpected sensitive events, I first present reduced-form evidence that the largest platform censored a higher number of keywords and complied faster on average than the smaller platforms. I then develop and estimate a structural model where three platforms compete for users by choosing whether to comply with the government’s censorship requests. By complying immediately, platforms may lose users who prefer to evade censorship by switching out. By delaying compliance, platforms incur a legal cost; however, the delay allows them to attract new users from their competitors who quickly comply with the government’s censorship requests. My counterfactual analysis predicts that if the less compliant small platform were to be shut down or merged with the medium platform, the remaining platforms could comply less often in equilibrium due to increased strategic incentives. This suggests that decentralizing online market power might help an authoritarian government control social media.